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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
We are asked to review the District Court's dismissal of 
Lawrence Lines' petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 
28 U.S.C. S 2254. The District Court held that Lines had 
not exhausted his state court remedies, and dismissed the 
petition without prejudice based upon that court's 
conclusion that Lines could return to state court to 
properly present his claims there. We agree that Lines has 
not exhausted his state court remedies. However, we 
conclude that returning to state court would be futile and 
that his claims are all procedurally defaulted. We also 
conclude that Lines can not establish cause and prejudice 
for the default and that failing to reach the merits of his 
petition would not result in a fundamental miscarriage of 
justice. We therefore hold that his petition must be 
dismissed with prejudice. Accordingly, we will affirm, but 
modify, the order of the District Court dismissing Lines 
petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. S 2254. 
 
I. Procedural and Factual Background 
 
The procedural history of this appeal illustrates just how 
serpentine the path to federal habeas review has become 
and the unexploded mines awaiting even seasoned 
practitioners who attempt to navigate under 28 U.S.C. 
S 2254.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. This is not to suggest that anyone other than Lines himself is 
responsible for much of the complexity here. It is his own conduct that 
has prevented him from getting the review he has been seeking in the 
state and federal courts. As will be seen from our discussion, his flight 
during the course of his jury trial tossed a procedural monkey wrench 
into subsequent proceedings in both state and federal court. 
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Lines was tried for murder in state court in 1986. 
However, he escaped from custody on October 10, 1986, 
while the jury was deliberating. The jury convicted Lines in 
absentia, and his trial attorney filed post-verdict motions on 
his behalf, and in his absence. Lines was apprehended on 
December 21, 1986, while those post-verdict motions were 
pending. Thereafter, he retained new counsel whofiled 
additional post-verdict motions on his behalf. The 
Commonwealth moved to quash the post-verdict motions, 
arguing that Lines was no longer entitled to seek post- 
verdict relief because he had absconded during his trial. 
However, the trial court never ruled on the 
Commonwealth's motion. Instead, the court held numerous 
evidentiary hearings on the merits of Lines' claims and, by 
order dated May 23, 1991, the trial court denied the post- 
verdict motions on the merits. On July 19, 1991, Lines was 
sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder conviction. 
 
Following sentencing, Lines filed a timely direct appeal to 
the Pennsylvania Superior Court in which he raised the 
following questions: 
 
       1. Did the attorney for the Commonwealth, in his 
       closing presentation, continuously express his 
       personal opinions of the evidence so as to deprive 
       the appellant of a fair trial? 
 
       2. Did the Commonwealth commit prosecutorial 
       misconduct in failing to disclose exculpatory 
       evidence concerning its star witness, failing to 
       comply with discovery rules, and failing to correct 
       perjured testimony of the star witness, thus 
       requiring a new trial? 
 
       3. Was the Defendant-Appellant denied effective 
       assistance of counsel when defense counsel 
       allowed the admittance of hearsay statements 
       without objection, failed to properly prepare for 
       trial and conduct an independent defense 
       investigation, failed to utilize character witness 
       testimony, and failed to develop and present a 
       coherent and cogent theory of defense? 
 
Brief of Appellant at 2.3 The Commonwealth responded by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Inasmuch as we must identify the issues Lines has raised in state 
court with precision in order to properly resolve this appeal, we set 
forth 
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asking the Superior Court to dismiss Lines' appeal based 
upon his flight. The Commonwealth argued that the trial 
court had erred in not quashing Lines' post-verdict motions 
because he had been a fugitive when his post-trial motions 
were filed. 
 
The Superior Court agreed with the Commonwealth, and 
held that the trial court had erred in failing to quash Lines' 
post-verdict motions. The court stated: "Pennsylvania law 
indicates that a trial court is without discretion and, 
therefore, must dismiss a defendant's post-trial motions as 
long as a defendant is a fugitive." Commonwealth v. Lines, 
415 Pa. Super. 438, 440, 609 A.2d 832, 833, allocatur 
denied, 532 Pa. 662, 618 A.2d 983 (1992). The court held 
that "appellant has forever forfeited his right to appeal by 
electing to become a fugitive after post-trial procedures 
have begun." Id., 415 Pa. Super. at 443, 609 A.2d at 834 
(internal quotation marks omitted). The court's holding was 
partially based upon a then-recent decision wherein the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had stated: 
 
       A defendant's voluntary escape acts as a per se 
       forfeiture of his rights of appeal, where the defendant 
       is a fugitive at any time after post-trial proceedings 
       commence. Such a forfeiture is irrevocable and 
       continues despite the defendant's capture or voluntary 
       return to custody. Thus, by choosing to flee from 
       justice, appellant has forever forfeited his right to 
       appeal. 
 
Commonwealth v. Jones, 530 Pa. 536, 541, 610 A.2d 439, 
441 (1992). In its opinion, the court listed Lines' 
substantive claims but did not address them.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
verbatim the "Questions Presented" section of the brief he filed with the 
Superior Court on direct appeal. See Brown v. Cuyler, 158-160 (3d Cir. 
1982) (we scrutinize the relevant pleadings and briefs to determine if a 
petitioner fairly presented his or her claim in state court). 
 
4. Judge Johnson filed a dissenting opinion that foreshadowed a change 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would subsequently make in the 
fugitive forfeiture rule. He argued that the majority ought not to have 
applied a per se forfeiture rule under the circumstances surrounding 
Lines' appeal. Judge Johnson stated: 
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Thereafter, Lines filed a timely Petition for Allowance of 
Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In his Petition, 
Lines challenged only the Superior Court's application of 
the fugitive forfeiture rule; he did not include the 
substantive claims he had raised in his brief to the 
Superior Court. On October 28, 1992, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court denied his Petition. 
 
On March 31, 1993, Lines filed a petition for collateral 
relief under Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 
Pa. C.S. SS 9501 et seq. He raised the following issues in 
that petition: 
 
       1. Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing 
       to submit to the appellate courts that their 
       retroactive application of Commonwealth v. Jones 
       to the appellant's case would be a violation of the 
       appellant's due process rights. 
 
       2. Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing 
       to submit to the appellate courts that a retroactive 
       application of Commonwealth v. Jones violates the 
       constitutional prohibition against ex post facto 
       laws. 
 
       3. Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing 
       to submit to the appellate courts that a five year 
       delay in the appellant's sentencing on the above- 
       captioned matter violated his Sixth Amendment 
       right to a speedy trial. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       I am unable to glean any support for the proposition that an 
       appellate court cannot review an appeal where the defendant was a 
       fugitive prior to appeal where the trial court did not dismiss 
post- 
 
       trial motions. . . . The cases relied on by the Majority fail to 
support 
       either that a trial court must dismiss a defendant's post-trial 
       motions if the defendant becomes a fugitive, or that this court has 
       no power to hear an appeal from a judgment of sentence rendered 
       against a defendant who was a fugitive prior to appeal where the 
       trial court has not dismissed his post-trial motions. 
 
Commonwealth v. Lines, 415 Pa. Super. at 447-448, 609 A.2d at 836- 
837 (Johnson, J., dissenting). Despite his disagreement with the 
majority, Judge Johnson would still have denied Lines relief, because he 
concluded Lines' claims were meritless. 
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       4. Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing 
       to raise whether trial counsel was ineffective when 
       he failed to object to the trial court's jury 
       instruction regarding accomplice testimony. 
 
       5. Whether the appellant is entitled to a new trial on 
       the basis of after-discovered evidence. 
 
The PCRA court began its discussion of Lines' petition by 
declaring: "it is the opinion of this court that this entire 
petition is improper." The court's view of the impropriety of 
Lines' PCRA petition was based, in part, upon the court's 
belief that "appellant is using this petition in an attempt to 
attack a Superior Court decision in which that court 
refused to adjudicate appellant's claims on the basis that 
appellant waived his appeal right because appellant 
absconded." The court concluded: "This collateral attack is 
impermissible." Opinion at 3. Nevertheless, the court 
assumed arguendo that Lines could "maintain such an 
appeal," id., and denied the petition on the merits without 
a hearing. 
 
Lines appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, 
which affirmed the denial on the merits of the PCRA 
petition as to all but one of the issues Lines had raised. The 
court found that Lines' challenge to appellate counsel's 
ineffectiveness for failing to raise a claim concerning trial 
counsel's ineffectiveness had been waived because Lines 
absconded. The court stated: 
 
       Since appellant's voluntary escape resulted not in a 
       waiver of those issues addressed in the quashed 
       appeal, but a complete forfeiture of his right  to appeal, 
       appellate counsel was effectively barred from raising 
       the issue of ineffectiveness of trial counsel and, thus, 
       cannot be deemed ineffective for having failed to 
       include certain issues in the direct appeal. 
 
Opinion at 3-4. Thereafter, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court denied Lines' Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 
the Superior Court's decision. 
 
On February 28, 1997, Lines filed the instant habeas 
corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. S 2254, raising the 
following claims: 
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       1. Lines' Due Process Rights were violated (1) when 
       the prosecutor refused, despite demand, to disclose 
       that John Gabriele had been immunized and (2) 
       when the prosecutor permitted John Gabriele to 
       perjure himself throughout his assertions of non- 
       involvement in drug activity. 
 
       2. Lines was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right 
       to the assistance of competent counsel at his trial 
       and his right to confront the witnesses against 
       him. 
 
       3. Lines' counsel's performance at trial fell below the 
       standard of competence required and deprived 
       Lines of his Sixth Amendment rights because: 
 
         (a) counsel failed to ask for severance of  counts; 
 
         (b) counsel failed to object to hearsay te stimony; 
 
         (c) counsel failed to adopt any theory of defense; 
       and 
 
         (d) counsel failed to call character witne sses. 
 
       4. The prosecutor's closing arguments constituted a 
       violation of due process by offering his personal 
       opinions concerning certain testimony. 
 
The Commonwealth asked the District Court to dismiss 
the petition based upon Lines' purported failure to exhaust 
remedies in state court. The Commonwealth argued that 
Lines was precluded from obtaining any relief under 28 
U.S.C. S 2254 because he had not presented any of his 
federal habeas claims to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 
The Commonwealth relied in part upon Fiegley v. Fulcomer, 
833 F.2d 29 (3d Cir. 1987), to argue that Lines was 
procedurally barred from federal habeas review because the 
Superior Court had quashed his appeal, and he could not 
establish the cause and prejudice that was a condition 
precedent to obtaining federal habeas relief on his defaulted 
claims. 
 
The District Court referred Lines' habeas petition to a 
Magistrate Judge who filed a Report and Recommendation 
recommending dismissal of the habeas petition. The 
Magistrate Judge reasoned that the Superior Court's 
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application of Pennsylvania's fugitive forfeiture rule did not 
excuse Lines from presenting his substantive claims to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Inasmuch as Lines could not 
demonstrate cause and prejudice for his failure to present 
the substance of his claims to the Supreme Court or that 
a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from not 
reviewing his claims, the Magistrate Judge concluded that 
Lines was not entitled to an adjudication on the merits of 
his habeas petition. 
 
Lines objected to the Report and Recommendation, and 
argued that the Magistrate Judge's conclusion was 
inconsistent with our holding in Doctor v. Walters, 96 F.3d 
675 (3rd Cir. 1996). The District Court disagreed with both 
the Magistrate Judge and Lines. The District Court 
concluded that: 
 
       it is not entirely clear that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
       Court would not have heard Petitioner's claims, nor 
       that Petitioner was procedurally barred from appealing 
       his claims to the state supreme court. Because [he] has 
       not appealed the issues in the instant petition to the 
       Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the highest state court 
       has not yet had the opportunity to review the merits of 
       the claims Petitioner now raises, and therefore, the 
       Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not been given the 
       chance to correct any alleged error or mistake of the 
       lower state court. 
 Opinion at 8. Under the District Court's interpretation of 
Doctor, Pennsylvania's fugitive forfeiture rule was not an 
independent and adequate state rule barring federal habeas 
review "because it was not firmly established at the time of 
the alleged waiver that a Pennsylvania court lacked the 
discretion to hear an appeal first filed after Petitioner had 
been returned to custody." Id. at 8-9. The court reasoned 
that "it is possible that the state supreme court would 
review Petitioner's claims, [and therefore] I must dismiss 
[the] petition . . . for Petitioner's failure to exhaust his state 
court remedies." Id. at 12. 
 
Lines filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the 
District Court had misconstrued Doctor. Lines asserted that 
Doctor required the court to excuse exhaustion and proceed 
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to the merits of the petition, rather than dismiss the 
petition for failure to exhaust. According to Lines, 
exhaustion is excused and the District Court should 
address his petition on the merits because Doctor held that 
the fugitive forfeiture rule is not an "independent and 
adequate" state rule that bars federal habeas relief. Reply at 
3-4. On appeal, Lines suggests that any failure to present 
the merits of his appeal to the Supreme Court must be 
excused. Lines argues that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court: 
 
       would not have considered [his underlying claims] until 
       and unless the [Superior C]ourt had considered them 
       and ruled on them. If the Supreme Court had felt, 
       however, that Lines was entitled to have his 
       constitutional issues heard by the Pennsylvania 
       Supreme Court, it could and would have remanded to 
       the Superior Court for consideration in the first 
       instance. 
 
(Brief at 8.).5 
 
Lines filed a timely notice of appeal from the District 
Court's denial of his habeas petition, and we granted his 
request for a certificate of appealability to determine 
whether the District Court correctly dismissed the petition 
for lack of exhaustion.6 On appeal, Lines repeats his 
argument that the District Court should have addressed 
the merits of his petition because exhaustion must be 
excused under the circumstances here. Lines contends that 
since he has already unsuccessfully filed one PCRA petition 
and a direct appeal, he has no means to exhaust his claims 
in state court, and the District Court should therefore hear 
his claims on the merits. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Lines cites Wiegand v. Wiegand, 461 Pa 482, 337 A.2d 256 (1975), 
and Paull v. Paull, 384 Pa. 2, 119 A.2d 93 (1958). However, these cases 
merely stand for the proposition -- irrelevant here -- that courts should 
not decide sua sponte issues not raised, briefed and argued by the 
parties. 
 
6. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. SS 1291 and 2253; our review is 
plenary, Doctor v. Walters, 96 F.3d at 678. 
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II. DISCUSSION 
 
A. General Principles 
 
All claims that a petitioner in state custody attempts to 
present to a federal court for habeas corpus review must 
have been fairly presented to each level of the state courts, 
28 U.S.C. S 2254(b); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 
1734 (1999) ("we ask not only whether a prisoner has 
exhausted his state remedies, but also whether he has 
properly exhausted those remedies, i.e., whether he has 
fairly presented his claims to the state courts,"7); Doctor, 96 
F.3d at 678. Thus, except as we discuss below, and except 
for petitions which can be denied on the merits, 8 federal 
courts refrain from addressing the merits of any claim 
raised by a habeas petitioner that was not properly 
exhausted in state court, Coleman v. Thompson , 501 U.S. 
722, 750 (1991). "The exhaustion requirement ensures that 
state courts have the first opportunity to review convictions 
and preserves the role of state courts in protecting federally 
guaranteed rights." Caswell v. Ryan, 953 F.2d 853, 856 (3d 
Cir. 1992). The burden of establishing that such claims 
were fairly presented falls upon the petitioner. Lambert v. 
Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997). Federal courts 
will dismiss without prejudice claims that have not been 
properly presented to the state courts, allowing petitioners 
to exhaust their claims. 
 
Petitioners who have not fairly presented their claims to 
the highest state court have failed to exhaust those claims. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In Boerckel, the Court held that a petitioner had to present claims 
forming the basis of his federal habeas petition to the Illinois Supreme 
Court even though Illinois (like Pennsylvania) had only a discretionary 
review of intermediate appellate court decisions and was apparently 
rather selective about the cases it actually reviewed. There, the 
petitioner 
had unsuccessfully attempted to argue a miscarriage of justice under 
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, (1995), by presenting evidence that he 
claimed showed that two others were actually responsible for the crime 
he had been convicted of. 119 S.Ct. at 1731. 
 
8. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2254(b)(2), a habeas corpus petition "may be 
denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to 
exhaust" available state remedies. 
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O'Sullivan v. Boerckel. If, however, state procedural rules 
bar a petitioner from seeking further relief in state courts, 
"the exhaustion requirement is satisfied because there is 
`an absence of available State corrective process.' 28 U.S.C. 
S 2254(b). McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 260 (3d 
Cir. 1999). Even so, this does not mean that a federal court 
may, without more, proceed to the merits. Rather, claims 
deemed exhausted because of a state procedural bar are 
procedurally defaulted, and federal courts may not consider 
their merits unless the petitioner "establishes`cause and 
prejudice' or a `fundamental miscarriage of justice' to 
excuse the default." Id. See also Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731.9 
 
B. General Principles Applied To Lines 
 
We conclude that Lines did not fairly present any of his 
claims to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Although we 
agree with Lines that it would now be futile for him to 
return to state court and attempt to exhaust his claims, we 
do not agree with him that a federal court may therefore 
address his claims on the merits. Rather, Lines' claims are 
procedurally defaulted because he is barred by state law 
from seeking further review of his claims in state court. 
Since Lines can not demonstrate cause and prejudice for 
the default, and since refraining from addressing the merits 
of his claims will not result in a fundamental miscarriage of 
justice, his petition should have been dismissed with 
prejudice. Although Judge Debevoise concludes in his 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The considerable confusion swirling around habeas review of state 
convictions is exacerbated by the interrelationship of procedural default 
and exhaustion. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. at 732 ("A habeas 
petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the 
technical requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies 
`available' to him"); McCandless, 172 F.3d at 263 ("because McCandless 
is procedurally barred from asserting these claims in state court, his 
claims are considered exhausted due to procedural default"); Grey v. 
Hoke, 933 F.2d 117, 120-121 (2d Cir. 1991) (because petitioner's claims 
would be procedurally barred by state law, no purpose would be served 
by making him return to state court; thus, "we hold that petitioner no 
longer has `remedies available' . . . and that he has met the statutory 
exhaustion requirements for presenting a habeas petition to the federal 
courts"). 
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dissent that our holding in Doctor requires that we excuse 
Lines' default, we conclude that Doctor is inapposite and 
does not control our analysis here. 
 
C. Lines' Direct Appeal 
 
As noted above, Lines raised the following substantive 
issues in his direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court: 
 
       1. Did the attorney for the Commonwealth, in his 
       closing presentation, continuously express his 
       personal opinions of the evidence so as to deprive 
       the appellant of a fair trial? 
 
       2. Did the Commonwealth commit prosecutorial 
       misconduct in failing to disclose exculpatory 
       evidence concerning its star witness, failing to 
       comply with discovery rules, and failing to correct 
       perjured testimony of the star witness, thus 
       requiring a new trial? 
 
       3. Was the Defendant-Appellant denied effective 
       assistance of counsel when defense counsel 
       allowed the admittance of hearsay statements 
       without objection, failed to properly prepare for 
       trial and conduct an independent defense 
       investigation, failed to utilize character witness 
       testimony, and failed to develop and present a 
       coherent and cogent theory of defense? 
 
Appellant's Brief to the Superior Court at 2. After the 
Superior Court dismissed Lines' appeal pursuant to 
Pennsylvania's fugitive forfeiture rule, Lines filed a Petition 
for Allowance of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
in which he challenged only the Superior Court's 
application of the forfeiture rule. His Petition for Allowance 
of Appeal stated the following two grounds for relief under 
the heading, "QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW": 
 
       1. Did the trial court have the discretion to hear the 
       post-trial motions of a defendant who was briefly 
       absent during the pendency of post-trial motions 
       but who was present for all the hearings on the 
       post-trial motions? 
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       2. Is a defendant who was a fugitive for a brief time 
       during the pendency of his post-trial motions but 
       present throughout all post-trial hearings and the 
       appeal process, forever barred from appellate 
       review? 
 
In the section of the Petition captioned: "CONCISE 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE," Lines outlined the 
circumstances of his flight during jury deliberations, his 
subsequent apprehension, the Commonwealth's Motion to 
Quash based upon his fugitive status, and the trial court's 
decision on the merits of his post-verdict claims. In doing 
so, he stated that he had "asked the [trial] Court to review" 
the three substantive grounds set forth above, and he 
reiterated each of those claims.10 However, in the seven and 
one-half pages in which he set forth his "CONCISE 
STATEMENT OF REASONS RELIED UPON FOR 
ALLOWANCE OF APPEAL," Lines presented only his 
challenge to the Superior Court's application of the fugitive 
forfeiture rule. He did not set forth any of the substantive 
claims he had relied upon in his brief to the Superior 
Court, nor did he discuss his underlying claims at any 
point in his Petition for Allowance of Appeal.11 
 
Rule 1115(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate 
Procedure12 prescribes the proper method for presenting an 
issue to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. It states that a 
Petition for Allowance of Appeal must contain, inter alia: 
 
       (3) The questions presented for review. . . . The 
       statement of questions presented will be deemed to 
       include every subsidiary question fairly comprised 
       therein. Only the questions set forth in the opinion, or 
       fairly comprised therein, will ordinarily be considered 
       by the court in the event an appeal is allowed. . . . 
 
       (5) A concise statement of the reasons relied on for 
       allowance of an appeal. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Petition for Allowance of Appeal at 3-4. 
 
11. See Petition for Allowance of Appeal at 6-13. 
 
12. The effective date of this version of Rule 1115, which is still 
current, 
was June 2, 1979. 
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(emphasis added).13 Rule 1115(c) provides: 
 
       All contentions in support of a petition for allowance of 
       appeal shall be set forth in the body of the petition as 
       provided by Paragraph (a)(5) of this rule. Neither the 
       briefs below nor any separate brief in support of a 
       petition for allowance of appeal will be received, and 
       the Prothonotary of the Supreme Court will refuse to 
       file any petition for allowance of appeal to which is 
       annexed or appended any brief below or supporting 
       brief. 
 
Finally, Rule 1115(d) provides as follows: 
 
       The failure of a petitioner to present with accuracy, 
       brevity, and clearness whatever is essential to a ready 
       and adequate understanding of the points requiring 
       consideration will be a sufficient reason for denying the 
       petition. 
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court strictly adheres to the 
letter of these rules and will not address claims that are not 
properly asserted in a Petition for Allowance of Appeal. 
Commonwealth v. Rush, 522 Pa. 379, 386-387, 562 A.2d 
285, 288 (1989), and cases cited therein. The Court has 
also emphasized that "all claims appellant wishes to raise 
must be set out in his brief and not merely incorporated by 
reference." Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 535 Pa. 210, 238 
n.3, 634 A.2d 1078, 1092 n.3 (1993). See also  Rule 
2116(a). 
 
As noted above, Lines challenged only the Superior 
Court's application of the fugitive forfeiture rule in the 
appropriate section of his Petition for Allowance of Appeal 
to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The trial court's 
opinion denying Lines' post-trial motions (which include the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. We emphasize "ordinarily" because the wording of Rule 1115(a) 
clearly suggests that, in an appropriate case, an appellant may include 
issues other than those relied upon by the Superior Court in the 
"CONCISE STATEMENT OF REASONS RELIED UPON FOR ALLOWANCE 
OF APPEAL" portion of a Petition for Discretionary Review to 
Pennsylvania's Supreme Court. Therefore, we conclude that Lines had an 
opportunity to include his substantive claims in his Petition for 
Allowance of Review under the unique circumstances of his case. 
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questions raised in the Superior Court) was appended to 
the petition, along with Superior Court's opinion. In 
addition, Lines' "Statement of the Case" in his Petition for 
Allowance of Appeal listed the questions raised in the 
Superior Court. However, Lines did not attempt to 
incorporate the issues discussed by the trial court by 
reference or otherwise, and the trial court's opinion does 
not fully state the substance of Lines' legal argument. 
Furthermore, it is clear that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court would not have addressed Lines' substantive claims 
if he had merely attempted to incorporate them by 
reference. See Edmiston, 535 Pa. at 238 n.3 ("Appellant also 
`incorporates by reference' claims in his post-trial motions 
as though set forth in his brief at length and requests this 
court to consider them in terms of ineffectiveness of trial 
counsel. We refuse to do so in that all claims appellant 
wishes us to consider must be set out in his brief and not 
merely incorporated by reference"). 
 
We therefore, conclude that Lines did not "fairly present" 
to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court any of the claims he 
raised on direct appeal. 
 
D. Claims Not Raised on Direct Appeal 
 
Lines concedes that his severance claim was not raised 
on direct appeal; nor was it presented in his PCRA petition. 
Lines also presents a Confrontation Clause claim in his 
habeas petition. Although this claim was not expressly 
raised on direct appeal to the Superior Court, Lines argues 
that it is subsumed within the hearsay argument which he 
presented to the Superior Court.14 However, even if Lines' 
hearsay argument sufficiently presented his Confrontation 
Clause claim, the hearsay argument, like the rest of his 
claims on direct appeal, was never fairly presented to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 
 
In sum, not one of Lines' claims was fairly presented to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. The Confrontation Clause is made applicable to the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment and provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the 
witnesses 
 
against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
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the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. As a result, he did not 
exhaust any of his claims. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 119 S.Ct. 
at 1733. 
 
III. Futility and Procedural Default 
 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2254(b)(1), exhaustion is excused 
if a return to state court would be futile because of "an 
absence of available State corrective process[,] or ... 
circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to 
protect the rights of the applicant." "Futility" exists where: 
"a state's highest court has ruled unfavorably on a claim 
involving facts and issues materially identical to those 
undergirding a federal habeas petition and there is no 
plausible reason to believe that a replay will persuade the 
court to reverse its field," Allen v. Attorney General of 
Maine, 80 F.3d 569, 573 (1st Cir. 1996); where the state 
provides no means of seeking the relief sought, Wallace v. 
Cody, 951 F.2d 1170, 1172 (10th Cir. 1991), Dawan v. 
Lockhart, 980 F.2d 470, 475 (8th Cir. 1992); or where the 
state courts have failed to alleviate obstacles to state review 
presented by circumstances such as the petitioner's pro se 
status, poor handwriting and illiteracy, Hollis v. Davis, 941 
F.2d 1471, 1473-1475, 1479 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 
503 S.Ct. 938 (1992). 
 
       If an appropriate remedy does not exist or its 
       utilization is frustrated by the state system. . .[t]he 
       deference accorded the state judicial process must give 
       way to the primary role of the federal courts to redress 
       constitutional deprivations. . . . If it appears that the 
       prisoner's rights have become an "empty shell" or that 
       the state process is a "procedural morass" offering no 
       hope of relief, then the federal courts may excuse the 
       prisoner from exhausting state remedies and may 
       directly consider the prisoner's constitutional claims. 
 
Hankins v. Fulcomer, 941 F.2d 246, 249-250 (3d Cir. 1991). 
Accordingly, we have held that exhaustion is not required 
if there is inordinate delay in state procedures, id. at 250, 
or if state officials have obstructed the petitioner's attempts 
to obtain state remedies, Mayberry v. Petsock , 821 F.2d 179 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 946 (1987). 
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As we noted in Doctor, "futility" is also established where 
"exhaustion is not possible because the state court would 
refuse on procedural grounds to hear the merits of the 
claims." Doctor, 96 F.3d at 681; Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 
F.3d 506, 518-519 (3d Cir. 1997). Lines' assertion of futility 
here is based upon the unavailability of further state 
process. We do not excuse exhaustion in this context 
unless state law clearly forecloses state court review of 
claims which have not previously been presented to a state 
court. Toulson v. Beyer, 987 F.2d 984, 988-989 (3d Cir. 
1993). 
 
       If the federal court is uncertain how a state court would 
       resolve a procedural default issue, it should dismiss 
       the petition for failure to exhaust state remedies even 
       if it is unlikely that the state court would consider the 
       merits to ensure that, in the interests of comity and 
       federalism, state courts are given every opportunity to 
       address claims arising from state proceedings. 
 Doctor, 96 F.3d at 681 (emphasis added), see also Lambert, 
134 F.3d at 516. The fact that it is merely unlikely that 
further state process is available is therefore insufficient to 
establish futility: 
 
       [I]f we permitted such a prediction to constitute the 
       type of futility which would allow a federal court to 
       excuse exhaustion, we would undermine the 
       exhaustion doctrine. Although exhaustion is often 
       cumbersome, and may appear to require duplicative 
       expenditure of judicial resources on claims that 
       frequently have no merit, the doctrine is premised on 
       firmly entrenched principles of comity. We are not free 
       to disregard those principles for the sake of expediency 
       or occasional efficiency. 
 
Gibson v. Scheidemantel, 805 F.2d 135, 141 (3d Cir. 1986). 
See also Banks v. Horn, 126 F.3d 206, 213 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act "which overall is intended to reduce federal intrusion 
into state criminal proceedings, reenforces" that federal 
courts ought to be reluctant to conclude that resort to state 
courts would be futile.). Thus, "[i]n questionable cases it is 
better that the state courts make the determination of 
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whether a claim is procedurally barred." Id . Accordingly, we 
must determine if we can conclude with certainty that the 
courts of Pennsylvania would no longer entertain Lines' 
substantive claims for relief. 
 
Lines filed his Petition for Allowance of Appeal more than 
seven years ago. We think it is obvious that he could not 
successfully amend a petition that has now been denied for 
seven years and include within it claims that he could have 
included when he first filed the petition.15 Thus, under 
Pennsylvania law, the only avenue that may be available to 
Lines is a second petition under the PCRA. Thus, we turn 
to the provisions of the PCRA to see if Lines canfile a 
second collateral attack in the state courts.16 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. See Caswell, 953 F.2d 853, 861 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
16. Pennsylvania has recently modified the fugitive forfeiture rule, and 
escape no longer results in an automatic forfeiture of one's right to 
appeal a conviction, or to file a petition under the PCRA. See In re. 
J.J., 
 
540 Pa. 274, 656 A.2d 1355, 1362-1363 (1995). However, in 
Commonwealth v. Huff, 540 Pa. 535, 658 A.2d 1340 (1995), the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court limited the retroactive application of new 
rules of law to cases pending at the time the new rule is announced. 
Commonwealth v. Cabeza, 503 Pa. 228, 469 A.2d 146 (1983); 
Commonwealth v. Selby, 547 Pa. 31, 688 A.2d 698, 700 (1997). The 
Court has clearly stated that new interpretations of law are "not to be 
interpreted to mean that once a decision has been made at the final 
stage of appeal, . . . that decision is subject to review, forevermore, 
should the law be changed." Commonwealth v. Ahearn, 357 Pa. Super. 
404, 407, 516 A.2d 45, 46 (1986). Lines' appeal became final three years 
before J.J. and Huff were decided, and Lines can not now obtain the 
benefit of those decisions in the courts of Pennsylvania. Moreover, in 
Commonwealth v. Deemer, 550 Pa. 290 (1997), the Supreme Court held 
that fugitives stand in the same position as appellants who have not 
absconded. Thus, 
 
       a fugitive who has returned to the jurisdiction of the court should 
       be allowed to exercise his post-trial rights in the same manner he 
       would have done had he not become a fugitive. . . . In short, a 
       fugitive who returns to court should be allowed to take the system 
of 
       criminal justice as he finds it upon his return. 
 
550 Pa. at 295-6 (emphasis added). Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court would not give Lines the benefit of the change in the law even if 
Lines could somehow once again challenge the Superior Court's 
application of the fugitive forfeiture doctrine to him. 
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42 Pa. C.S.A. S 9545(b)(1) limits the availability of PCRA 
relief. It states: 
 
       Any petition under this subchapter, including a second 
       or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of 
       the date the judgment becomes final, unless the 
       petition alleges and the petitioner proves that: 
 
       (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the 
       result of interference by government officials with the 
       presentation of the claim . . . . 
 
       (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were 
       unknown to the petitioner and could not have been 
       ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or 
 
       (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right  that 
       was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United 
       States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after 
       the time period provided in this section and has been 
       held by that court to apply retroactively. 
 
Under section 9545(b)(3), a prior petition becomesfinal 
for PCRA purposes "at the conclusion of direct review, 
including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the 
United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or 
at the expiration of time for seeking the review." 
Commonwealth v. Banks, ___ Pa. ___, ___, 726 A.2d 374, 
375 (1999). Under Banks, it is now clear that the one year 
limitation applies to all PCRA petitions including a second 
petition, no matter when the first was filed. 17 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. In Banks, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the time 
restrictions for seeking relief under Pennsylvania's Post Conviction 
Relief 
 
Act are jurisdictional. Prior to Banks there was some doubt as to the 
proper scope and application of the one year limitations period under the 
amended PCRA. In Commonwealth v. Thomas, ___ A.2d ___, 1998 WL 
648515 (Pa. Super. September 16, 1998), the Superior Court expressly 
rejected two possible interpretations of this period of limitations: that 
a 
 
second or subsequent PCRA petition is timely if thefirst PCRA petition 
was filed by January 16, 1997, one year after the effective date of the 
1995 amendments; and that all second or subsequent PCRA petitions 
are timely so long as the first PCRA petition wasfiled either one year 
before or one year after the effective date of the 1995 amendments. The 
court stated instead, "we hold that it was the intention of the 
legislature 
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Clearly, more than a year has passed since Lines' 
judgment of conviction became final18  and none of the 
aforementioned exceptions to the limitations period applies 
to Lines' claims. He does not allege that improper 
governmental interference or previously unknown facts 
prevented him from asserting them in state court in a 
timely manner, nor does he base his claims upon the 
assertion of a new constitutional right. 
 
Moreover, 42 Pa. C.S.A. S 9543(a)(3) provides that claims 
raised in a PCRA petition must not have been "previously 
litigated or waived." Section 9544 defines those terms as 
follows: 
 
       (a)  Previous litigation. -- For purpose s of this 
       subchapter, an issue has been previously litigated if: 
       . . . 
 
       (2) the highest appellate court in which the 
       petitioner could have had review as a matter of right 
       has ruled on the merits of the issue; or 
 
       (3) it has been raised and decided in a proceeding 
       collaterally attacking the conviction or sentence. 
 
       (b) Issues waived. -- For purposes of th is subchapter, 
       an issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised it 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
to permit an otherwise untimely first PCRA petition to be filed within one 
year following the effective date of the 1995 PCRA amendments, but that 
exception was not intended to apply to subsequent petitions regardless 
of when a first petition was filed." Id . at *3. 
 
Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has now clearly stated that 
the PCRA is the only method of seeking review of a conviction after direct 
appeal, and that common law writs that were previously available under 
state law have been subsumed within the PCRA. See Commonwealth v 
Ahlborn, 548 Pa. 544, 549 ("The PCRA specifies that it is the sole means 
of obtaining collateral relief and that it supersedes common law 
remedies.") 
 
18. Since Lines apparently did not seek certiorari to the United States 
Supreme Court, the judgment against him became final ninety days after 
October 28, 1992, the date on which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
denied Lines' petition for allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth v. 
Perry, 716 A.2d 1259, 1261 (Pa. Super. 1998). 
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       but failed to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary 
       review, on appeal or in a prior state postconviction 
       proceeding. 
 
When Lines filed his first PCRA petition he was 
represented by counsel other than trial counsel. Therefore, 
he could have raised the issue of trial counsel's 
ineffectiveness in failing to move for a severance in his first 
PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Griffin, 537 Pa. 447, 
454 (1994) (a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel under the 
PCRA must be raised at the earliest stage in the 
proceedings after petitioner is no longer represented by 
allegedly ineffective counsel). Under Pennsylvania law Lines 
could attempt to challenge the stewardship of PCRA 
counsel even though he is not guaranteed the right to 
counsel to collaterally attack his conviction under the 
United States Constitution. See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 
554 Pa. 31, 43 (1999) ("we have never found our power of 
review, and if necessary, remedy deficiencies of counsel at 
the post-conviction stage circumscribed by the parameters 
of the Sixth Amendment."). However, the only vehicle for 
now doing so is a second P.C.R.A. petition. As we noted 
above, the period for filing such a petition has long since 
run, and the courts of Pennsylvania therefore no longer 
have jurisdiction to entertain a successive P.C.R.A. petition. 
Banks, 726 A.2d at 376 ("the issue . . . is one of 
jurisdiction. . ."). Accordingly, we conclude that it would be 
futile for Lines to return to state court in an effort to 
attempt to bring a second PCRA proceeding raising the 
unexhausted claims he has included in his federal habeas 
petition. 
 
Thus, although "federal courts should be most cautious 
before reaching a conclusion dependent upon an intricate 
analysis of state law that a claim is procedurally barred," 
Banks v. Horn, 126 F.3d at 213, the aforementioned 
considerations combine to convince us that Lines is now 
"clearly foreclosed" from further state court review of his 
claims. As a result, exhaustion would be futile and is 
excused. Put another way, based upon the futility of 
requiring Lines to cure his procedural default, we will 
consider his claims exhausted because "there are no state 
remedies available to him." Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732. 
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As noted above, it does not necessarily follow, however, 
that Lines is entitled to an adjudication of the merits of his 
unexhausted federal habeas claims merely because it is 
now futile to attempt to raise them in state court. A finding 
of futility merely eliminates the procedural pretense of 
requiring a federal habeas petitioner to return to an 
unavailable state forum for nonexistent relief. Futility, 
without more,19 does not mean that the federal courts may 
proceed to the merits of the petitioner's claims. As the court 
said in Whittlesey v. Circuit Court for Baltimore County, 897 
F.2d 143, 146 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 922 (1990) 
(another escape case): 
 
       That it may now be "futile" for Whittlesey to await 
       completion of his Florida sentence to challenge his 
       Maryland conviction begs the question of how that 
       futility has come about. The equitable principles 
       governing habeas relief will not permit Whittlesey to 
       create a situation in which seeking state post- 
       conviction relief is futile, and then invoke that same 
       futility to avoid the exhaustion requirement. 
 
When exhaustion is futile because state relief is 
procedurally barred, federal courts may only reach the 
merits if the petitioner makes the standard showing of 
"cause and prejudice" or establishes a fundamental 
miscarriage of justice. Caswell, 953 F.2d at 861 (3d Cir. 
1992). Unlike the petitioners in Doctor, Toulson, and 
Lambert, Lines is not asserting his actual innocence or 
facts that would suggest a "miscarriage of justice" in the 
context of federal habeas jurisprudence. See Schlup v. Delo, 
513 U.S. 298 (1995). Accordingly, we must focus on 
whether Lines can establish "cause and prejudice" for his 
default in state court. McCandless, 172 F.3d at 263. See 
also Caswell, 953 F.2d at 861 (citing Coleman, 111 S.Ct. at 
2557 n.1). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. Typically, failures by the state: inordinate delay, failure to provide 
adequate remedies, and the like. See, e.g., Allen, Wallace, Hollis, 
Mayberry, and Hankins, supra. 
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IV. Cause and Prejudice 
 
The only purported "cause" on this record is prior 
appellate counsel's failure to raise and fairly present all of 
Lines' substantive claims in state court. However, that is 
not sufficient. The "cause" required to excuse a procedural 
default must result from circumstances that are"external 
to the petitioner, something that cannot fairly be attributed 
to him" Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753. "Attorney inadvertence 
is not `cause' because the attorney is the petitioner's agent 
when acting or failing to act, in furtherance of the litigation, 
and the petitioner must `bear the risk' of attorney error. 
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753. Lines does not argue that 
counsel on direct appeal was constitutionally ineffective for 
failing to present the substance of his claims to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court on direct appeal.20 In fact, he 
argues that his attorney could not present those claims 
because the Superior Court never reached them. Given the 
unique circumstances facing original appellate counsel, 
that attorney can not be faulted for failing to include Lines' 
substantive claims in the Petition for Allowance of Appeal. 
After all, the decision that Lines wanted the Supreme Court 
to review did not address the merits of his claims. 
Accordingly, counsel limited Lines' Petition for Allowance of 
Appeal to the Superior Court's application of the fugitive 
forfeiture doctrine as that was the basis of the Court's 
dismissal of his appeal.21 Thus, we are not now charged 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. Inasmuch as a defendant is entitled to counsel on direct appeal, a 
successful challenge to the effectiveness of counsel's representation on 
direct appeal under Strickland can establish the necessary cause to 
excuse a procedural default. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 754 ("Where a 
petitioner defaults a claim as a result of the denial of the right to 
effective assistance of counsel, the state, which is responsible for the 
denial as a constitutional matter, must bear the cost of any resulting 
default and the harm to the state interests that federal habeas review 
entails.") 
21. This is not to suggest that counsel could not have included the 
substantive issues in his Petition for Allowance of Appeal. As we noted 
above, Doctor attempted exactly that when he appealed the Superior 
Court's application of the fugitive forfeiture rule although it appears 
that 
Doctor included his substantive claims in his brief, and that the 
substantive issue he briefed -- a due process violation -- did not fairly 
present his subsequent assertion that "a trial in absentia was never 
held." 96 F.3d at 680. As noted above, merely including a claim in the 
brief to the Supreme Court is not sufficient to fairly present the claim. 
However, we note what occurred in Doctor to contrast Doctor's appeal 
with Lines' appeal. 
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with evaluating the stewardship of original appellate 
counsel, or assessing blame for any "dereliction" on his 
part. Moreover, claims of constitutional ineffectiveness 
must themselves be exhausted by proper presentation to 
the state courts and here that was not even attempted. See 
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 489 (1986). Thus, Lines 
has not demonstrated any "cause" for defaulting the claims 
raised on his direct appeal. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753. 
 
We reach the same conclusion with regard to Lines' 
severance claim. Lines can not now successfully argue that 
PCRA counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to 
include a severance claim in his PCRA petition, and he has 
not argued that counsel was ineffective in failing to raise it 
on direct appeal.22 Accordingly, we hold that the District 
Court did not err in dismissing Lines' habeas petition. 
Although the District Court's analysis differed from ours, 
the result is the same; although our analysis causes us to 
modify the District Court's relief. 
 
In his thoughtful analysis, our dissenting colleague 
agrees with the majority's conclusion that it would be futile 
for Lines to return to state court. However, Judge Debevoise 
relies upon Doctor to conclude that "the peculiar state of 
Pennsylvania's fugitive forfeiture rule both at the time Lines 
committed his crime and at the time he sought review of 
his conviction. . . ." should excuse the exhaustion 
requirement. Dissent at 1. The parties also devote a 
substantial portion of their briefs to discuss the relevance 
of our holding in Doctor. However, we think that Doctor is 
inapposite to our analysis of the issues surrounding Lines' 
habeas petition. 
 
V. Doctor v. Walters 
 
Both Lines and the Commonwealth devote a substantial 
portion of their briefs to arguing whether Pennsylvania's 
fugitive forfeiture rule is an adequate and independent state 
ground under our holding in Doctor as applied to Lines. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. Moreover, as noted above, that claim of ineffectiveness would itself 
have to be presented to the state courts in thefirst instance. Murray, 
supra. 
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However, despite the parties' focus upon Doctor , we 
conclude that our holding there is neither controlling nor 
helpful to the present inquiry; although the facts in Doctor 
are quite similar to the facts here. 
 
Like Lines, Doctor fled during his bench trial on criminal 
charges. However, the trial court thereafter entered a guilty 
verdict against Doctor "apparently without conducting any 
further proceedings or attempting to inform Doctor, his 
attorney or the Commonwealth about its intention to enter 
a verdict." 96 F.3d at 678. Lines was not apprehended until 
five years later, and he was then formally sentenced on the 
guilty verdict that had been entered when he escaped. 
Doctor filed a direct appeal, and a state habeas corpus 
petition. However, the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
quashed his appeal pursuant to Pa. R. App. P. 1972(6), 
which allows an appellate court to quash an appeal 
"because the appellant is a fugitive." The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court denied Doctor's Petition for Allowance of 
Appeal, and the United States Supreme Court denied his 
petition for a writ of certiorari. However, unlike Lines, 
Doctor attempted to present his underlying claims on direct 
appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as well as his 
challenges to the Superior Court's application of the fugitive 
forfeiture rule.23 
 
Thereafter, Doctor filed a petition under 28 U.S.C.S 2254 
in an attempt to get federal habeas relief from his state 
court conviction. Doctor's S 2254 petition included a claim 
that his conviction in absentia violated his Sixth 
Amendment right to a trial. The District Court dismissed 
Doctor's petition for failure to exhaust because the Sixth 
Amendment claim had not been presented in state court. 
Doctor argued that it was futile to return to state court to 
raise any unexhausted claims in a PCRA petition because 
the Pennsylvania courts had already determined that his 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. We nevertheless concluded that Doctor had not fairly presented all of 
his substantive claims to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court because, 
although the brief that accompanied his Petition for Allowance of Appeal 
asserted a denial of his "Constitutional right to due process," we 
concluded that he had not adequately alleged "that a trial in absentia 
was never held," 96 F.3d at 680, as alleged in his federal habeas 
petition. 
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 flight constituted a waiver of his right to appeal, and they 
therefore would not address any PCRA petition that he 
might file in an effort to exhaust his Sixth Amendment 
claim for federal habeas purposes. 96 F.3d at 680. 
 
We affirmed the District Court's dismissal based upon 
the unexhausted claims in Doctor's petition. However, we 
also noted that Doctor could "resubmit a petition asserting 
only his exhausted claims." Therefore, "in the interests of 
judicial economy," we addressed the District Court's 
conclusion that application of Pennsylvania's fugitive 
forfeiture rule was an adequate and independent state rule 
barring federal habeas relief. Id. at 683. 
 
We concluded that, under Pennsylvania law, Doctor could 
seek collateral relief by asserting his Sixth Amendment 
claim in a PCRA petition, see 42 Pa.C.S.S 9541- 46 (Supp. 
1996), because "all avenues of direct appeal are clearly 
foreclosed." 96 F.3d at 682. However, we recognized that 
such collateral review was problematic both because he had 
not raised his Sixth Amendment claim on direct appeal, 
and because "under the fugitive forfeiture rule[Doctor] 
waived all rights to have his claims considered." Id. at 681. 
We noted, however, that Pennsylvania courts allowed for a 
"limited exception" to the application of the fugitive 
forfeiture rule when a petitioner could demonstrate either a 
"miscarriage of justice, which no civilized society can 
tolerate," or "actual innocence." Id . at 682 (citing 
Commonwealth v. Lawson, 519 Pa. 504, 549 (1988)). We 
concluded that the unique and rather bizarre 
circumstances surrounding Doctor's in absentia  conviction 
were such that we could not conclude with certainty that 
the Pennsylvania courts would not find a miscarriage of 
justice. 96 F.3d at 682 ("Doctor alleges facts that could 
support a finding that `the proceedings resulting in his 
conviction were so unfair that a miscarriage of justice 
occurred which no civilized society can tolerate.' ").24 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
24. In his S 2254 petition, Doctor claimed:"No record of trial of Absentia 
said to have been held on Aug. 29th 1986--I was not convicted in a 
court of law--I was never told on record or otherwise I was found guilty 
--I was never given any appeal rights before or after sentencing. No 
attorney is on record to have represented me in the mysterious absentia 
trial held--the trial transcripts in my case stop on page 129 at which 
time case was continued generally." Doctor , 96 F.3d at 679. 
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Moreover, an examination of Pennsylvania cases 
established that when Doctor escaped, Pennsylvania courts 
recognized that they had the discretion to hear an appeal 
so long as custody of the fugitive-appellant "had been 
restored before the appellate process was ever initiated," id. 
at 685-6, as was the case there. Accordingly, we held that 
Pennsylvania's fugitive forfeiture rule was not an adequate 
and independent state rule, and that we could not say with 
certainty that the state courts would turn a deaf ear to 
Doctor's Sixth Amendment claim. Thus, we dismissed 
Doctor's petition and allowed him to attempt to exhaust his 
claim in state court. However, for all the reasons we have 
noted, it would be futile for Lines to do so. Moreover, Lines 
does not argue (nor can he) that our failure to address the 
merits of his claim would create the substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice that we found in Doctor . 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude 
that the District Court did not err in dismissing Lines' 
federal habeas petition; and we will affirm, but modify, the 
District Court's order by dismissing the petition with 
prejudice. 
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DEBEVOISE, Senior District Judge, dissenting: 
 
I have no quarrel with the majority opinion's thorough 
analysis of federal law governing exhaustion, futility and 
cause and prejudice or with their analysis concerning 
Lines's right to further review of his constitutional claims 
under Pennsylvania procedural law. It is my view, however, 
that these analyses are largely irrelevant in the present 
case. By reason of the peculiar state of Pennsylvania's 
fugitive forfeiture rule both at the time Lines committed his 
crime and at the time he sought review of his conviction (i) 
exhaustion was excused from the outset because state law 
foreclosed review of any of his claims and (ii) flight did not 
constitute a procedural default requiring a cause and 
prejudice review. The reasoning of Doctor v. Walters, 96 
F.3d 675(3d Cir. 1996) compels this result. 
 
The majority opinion sets forth the governing law: 
 
        Petitioners who have not fairly presented their claims 
       to the highest state court have failed to exhaust those 
       claims. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel. If, however, state 
       procedural rules bar a petitioner from seeking further 
       relief in state courts, "the exhaustion requirement is 
       satisfied because there is `an absence of available State 
       corrective process.' 28 U.S.C. S 2254(b). McCandless v. 
       Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 260 (3d Cir. 1999). Even so, 
       this does not mean that a federal court may, without 
       more, proceed to the merits. Rather, claims deemed 
       exhausted because of a state procedural bar are 
       procedurally defaulted, and federal courts may not 
       consider their merits unless the petitioner "establishes 
       `cause and prejudice' or a `fundamental miscarriage of 
       justice' to excuse the default." Id. See also Coleman, 
       501 U.S. at 731. 
 
Slip Op. at 10-11. (Footnote omitted.) 
 
Lines became a fugitive on October 10, 1986 and was 
convicted in absentia. He was apprehended on December 
21, 1986, pursued post-verdict motions and was sentenced 
to life imprisonment on July 19, 1991. Thereafter, as 
recited in the majority opinion, he pursued his appeal to 
the Pennsylvania Superior Court, his Petition for Allowance 
of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court (denied 
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October 28, 1992), his PCRA petition (filed March 31, 1993) 
and unsuccessful appeals from denial of the PCRA petition. 
 
During and after the time frame encompassed by these 
proceedings Pennsylvania's fugitive forfeiture rule, as 
interpreted by Pennsylvania's Supreme Court, went through 
a series of transformations. The applicable procedural rule, 
Pa. R. App. P. 1972(6), provides in relevant part that "any 
party may move: . . . (6) [t]o continue generally or to quash 
because the appellant is a fugitive. . . ." In Doctor this court 
had occasion to determine the manner in which the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court construed this rule as of June 
24, 1986, the date when Doctor had fled from his criminal 
trial. Lines fled on October 10 of the same year, and there 
is nothing to suggest that Pennsylvania's law on the subject 
changed during the less than four months interval between 
his and Doctor's flights. The state of the law at relevant 
times was critical in Doctor, and for the same reasons it is 
critical in the present case. 
 
Doctor had submitted a mixed habeas corpus petition, 
containing exhausted and unexhausted claims. Following 
the dictate of Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 102 S. Ct. 
1198, 71 L. Ed.2d 379 (1982), this court affirmed the 
district Court's dismissal of the petition. The district court, 
however, had dismissed the petition not only on failure to 
exhaust grounds. It also found that the Pennsylvania 
courts' refusal to consider the merits of Doctor's direct 
appeals based on the fugitive forfeiture rule constituted 
application of an independent and adequate state 
procedural rule. Doctor's failure to comply with that rule 
constituted a procedural default, requiring dismissal of the 
habeas petition since he had not shown cause and 
prejudice. Anticipating that Doctor might file a new petition 
containing only exhausted claims and that he would again 
be faced with the procedural default contention, this court 
addressed the merits of that defense. 
 
A habeas petitioner is entitled to federal review of a 
procedurally defaulted claim only if he can demonstrate 
cause for the procedural default and prejudice resulting 
therefrom. Doctor, 96 F.3d at 683. However,"[a] state rule 
provides an independent and adequate basis for precluding 
federal review of a state prisoner's habeas claim only if: (1) 
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the state procedural rule speaks in unmistakable terms; (2) 
all state appellate courts refused to review the petitioner's 
claims on the merits; and (3) the state courts' refusal in 
this instance is consistent with other decisions." Id. at 683- 
684. 
 
Doctor analyzed two pre-1986 Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court decisions applying the fugitive forfeiture rule. 
Commonwealth v. Galloway, 460 Pa. 309, 333 A.2d 741 
(1975) (There was no basis to dismiss a formerly fugitive 
defendant's appeal because he was in custody when the 
case was actually argued and would therefore be subject to 
the jurisdiction of the court and thus responsive to any 
judgment entered) and Commonwealth v. Passaro , 504 Pa. 
611, 476 A.2d 346 (1984) (Petition of defendant who 
absconded during appeal to reinstate appeal after recapture 
denied). Doctor also noted that after Galloway and prior to 
1986 Pennsylvania's intermediate courts consistently 
recognized their discretion to hear a properly filed appeal as 
long as the criminal defendant had returned to the 
jurisdiction before the appeal was dismissed. 
 
Based on this review of the state of Pennsylvania law as 
it existed in 1986, this court held that as of that date "it 
was not `firmly established' that Pennsylvania courts lacked 
the discretion to hear an appeal first filed after custody had 
been established," and consequently "the state courts in 
this case did not rely on an `adequate' procedural rule to 
deny petitioner a review of his appeal on the merits." 
Doctor, 96 F.2d at 686. In these circumstances Doctor was 
not required to establish cause and prejudice in the event 
he filed a habeas petition containing only exhausted claims. 
 
In 1992 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court firmly closed 
the door to any appeals by a fugitive defendant, stating: 
 
       A defendant's voluntary escape acts as a per se 
       forfeiture of his rights of appeal, where the defendant 
       is a fugitive at any time after post-trial proceedings 
       commence. Such a forfeiture is irrevocable and 
       continues despite the defendant's capture or voluntary 
       return to custody. Thus, by choosing to flee from 
       justice, appellant has forever forfeited his right to 
       appeal. 
 
                                30 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Jones, 530 Pa. 536, 541, 610 A.2d 439, 
441 (1992). This was the state of the law when the Superior 
Court held that the trial court erred in failing to quash 
Lines's post-verdict motions and that Lines had"forever 
forfeited his right to appeal by electing to become a fugitive 
after post-trial procedures have begun." Commonwealth v. 
Lines, 415 Pa. Super. 438, 443, 609 A.2d 832, 834, 
allocatur denied, 532 Pa. 662, 618 A.2d 983 (1992). It was 
the state of the law when the Supreme Court denied Lines's 
Petition for Allowance of Appeal. 
 
Subsequently the Pennsylvania Supreme Court again 
revisited the fugitive forfeiture rule, holding that the 
sanction for absconding must be a reasonable response to 
a defendant's flight, and there must be some rational link 
between the flight and the appellate process to justify 
imposing a forfeiture on a defendant. In re J.J. , 540 Pa. 
274, 656 A.2d 1355 (1995); Commonwealth v. Huff , 540 Pa. 
535, 658 A.2d 1340 (1995). Pennsylvania's rule limiting 
retroactive application of new rules of law to cases pending 
at the time the new rule is announced precluded and still 
precludes Lines from taking advantage of this change in the 
law. 
 
Whether Lines is confronted with a procedural default 
and must establish cause and prejudice must be 
determined on the basis of Pennsylvania's fugitive forfeiture 
rule as it existed in 1986 when he became a fugitive. As 
stated in Doctor, "We must decide whether[the fugitive 
forfeiture rule] was firmly established and regularly applied, 
not in 1993 when the Supreme Court relied on it, but 
rather as of the date of the waiver that allegedly occurred 
when Doctor escaped in 1986" at 684. As recited above, in 
1986 when Lines escaped the fugitive forfeiture rule was 
not firmly established and regularly applied. Consequently, 
his petition is not subject to a procedural default defense 
based on the fugitive forfeiture rule and he is not required 
to establish cause and prejudice. 
 
On the other hand, when Lines sought relief from his 
conviction in the state courts Pennsylvania law had 
changed. By that time the fugitive forfeiture rule, as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court, had become an 
impenetrable barrier to relief of any sort in the state courts. 
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Not only were an appeal and a PCRA petition futile, there 
was a total absence of available state corrective process of 
any sort.1 In these circumstances exhaustion is excused 
and Lines must be permitted to assert in a habeas petition 
both the grounds he raised in his abortive appeal to the 
Superior Court and the ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim based on the failure of trial counsel to move for 
severance which he did not raise in any Pennsylvania court. 
 
The same impenetrable barrier prevailed when Doctor 
sought relief in the state courts. In his case, however, this 
court detected a small chink in this barrier, namely, an 
appeal or a PCRA petition in which the once fugitive 
petitioner seeking relief from a waiver "can demonstrate a 
`miscarriage of justice, which no civilized society can 
tolerate.' " Doctor, 96 F.2d at 682. This court rejected 
Doctor's futility contention stating "[w]e cannot conclude 
that there is no chance that the Pennsylvania courts would 
find a miscarriage of justice sufficient to override the waiver 
requirements and permit review under PCRA." Id. at 683. 
Doctor contended that lack of a trial even in absentia 
violated his Sixth Amendment rights. This court opined 
that the Pennsylvania courts might consider this a 
miscarriage of justice claim which would override a fugitive 
forfeiture waiver. It would follow that had this court not 
found that Doctor's unexhausted claim asserted 
miscarriage of justice, it would have concluded that it 
would have been futile to require him to return to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. See 28 U.S.C. S 2254(b)(1): 
 
       (b)(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a 
       person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall 
       not be granted unless it appears that-- 
 
       (A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in 
       courts of the State; or 
 
       (B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; 
 
       or 
 
       (ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to 
       protect the rights of the applicant. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
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Pennsylvania courts and exhaustion would have been 
excused. 
 
In the present case Lines does not assert any claims 
which might be characterized as a "miscarriage of justice, 
which no civilized society can tolerate." Thus the reasoning 
of Doctor compels the conclusion that exhaustion was 
excused in the present case because it would have been 
futile to require that Lines exhaust state remedies. 26 
 
It is my view that it is unnecessary to determine the 
extent to which Lines raised his various claims in one or 
another of his abortive state court proceedings. From the 
outset under the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's then 
prevailing application of the fugitive forfeiture rule, Lines 
had no right to appeal or to post conviction relief of any 
sort. The fact that he did seek state court relief is of no 
moment. It was all an exercise in futility which he had no 
obligation to pursue. In these circumstances he should be 
permitted to assert in the district court all the claims set 
forth in his S 2254 petition. 
 
For the reasons set forth above I dissent from the 
majority opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
26. In Doctor, the petitioner had in fact sought to present his other 
federal claims to the Pennsylvania Superior and Supreme Courts, only to 
have them dismissed on the basis of the fugitive forfeiture rule. Thus 
there was no need for this court to consider whether failure to have 
raised those non-miscarriage of justice claims in the state courts would 
have been excused as futile. After the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
changed its interpretation of the fugitive forfeiture rule to make its 
application discretionary, failure of a fugitive to exhaust his state 
remedies could no longer be excused on futility grounds. 
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